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Summary 
The devastating COVID-19 disease 
outbreak of 2020 is likely to cause a 
profound rethink of how national and 
international communities deal with 
such outbreaks whether they are caused 
naturally, accidentally or deliberately. 
This paper suggests that now is the time 
to build on two decades of work within 
the BTWC and for States Parties to agree 
on a Biosecurity Code of Conduct under 
the Convention as proposed by China. 
Over the past two decades, as part of their 
attempts to strengthen the BTWC and 
thereby to help prevent the development 
of biological and toxin weapons, States 
Parties have given considerable attention 
to the potential utility of Codes of 
Conduct for life and associated scientists. 
This paper reviews these debates about 
this novel dual-use ethical challenge 
within the Convention and concludes 
that a Code of Conduct should be agreed 
at the 2021 Review Conference, but that 
radical reorientation of the mandatory 
education of such scientists will also be 
needed to make the agreed code effective. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
argely out of sight of most people, 
States Parties to the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
have been meeting at the United Nations in 
Geneva over the last two decades trying to 
find ways to strengthen the Convention 
following the failure to agree on a Protocol 
during the 1990s. Given the application of 
developments in science in the major 
offensive military biological warfare 
programmes of the Twentieth Century, 
where viruses, toxins, bacteria and fungi had 
been weaponised1, one major concern for the 
States has been the impact of rapid advances 
in the life sciences on the potential ease with 
which novel and very dangerous biological 
and toxin weapons could be developed by 
States, Non-State Actors, or even 
individuals.2 The devastating COVID-19 
disease outbreak in early 2020 is likely to 
cause a major rethink about the dangers of 
natural, accidental and deliberate disease 
outbreaks in humans, animals and plants 
when the outbreak is eventually brought 
under control3. As part of that rethink, it 
should be possible now, 45 years after the 
Convention entered into force4, to bring the 
protracted discussions on a Code of Conduct 
under the Convention to a successful 
conclusion at the 2021 9th Five-Year Review 
Conference of the BTWC. This would make 
a major contribution to the prevention of 
further such outbreaks by engaging life 
scientists effectively for the first time in 
support of the prohibition of biological 
weapons that are embodied in the BTWC. 
The problem that concerns States Parties to 
the BTWC was set out at the turn of the 
century in 2000 by Matthew Meselson, 
Professor of Molecular Biology at Harvard 
University when he questioned whether, as 
all previous scientific and technological 
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revolutions had been applied in major ways 
to hostile purposes, it was probable that the 
same would happen to the revolution in civil 
biotechnology unless we found ways to 
prevent that happening. He also thought that 
this would be a long drawn out struggle, 
stating that:5 
 
“…During the century ahead, as our ability 
to modify fundamental life processes 
continues its rapid advance, we will be able 
not only to devise additional ways to destroy 
life but will also become able to manipulate 
it – including the processes of cognition, 
development, reproduction and 
inheritance….Therein could lie 
unprecedented opportunities for violence, 
coercion, repression, or subjugation…” 
 
And he pointed out that dangerous 
capabilities could be available to a much 
wider range of actors than were available in 
relation to nuclear weapons: 
 
“…Unlike the technologies of conventional 
or even nuclear weapons, biotechnology has 
the potential to place mass destructive 
capabilities in a multitude of hands and, in 
coming decades, to reach deeply into what 
we are and how we regard ourselves. It 
should be evident that any intensive 
exploitation of biotechnology for hostile 
purposes could take humanity down a 
particularly undesirable path.” 
 
In the following two decades these concerns 
were illustrated by a series of publications 
of experiments by civil scientists that caused 
increasing consternation amongst the 
security analysts about the possibility of 
their facilitating the development of novel 
biological weapons, and this led to a series of 
major meetings and reports about this 
problem of dual use – the fact that benignly- 
intended civil research might later be used 
by others for hostile purposes. It became 
clear during these two decades that a range 
of different means applied at various levels 
in a “Web of Prevention”6 would be required 
in order to minimize the potential for the 
biotechnology revolution to be misapplied for 
hostile purposes.7 This paper examines the 
evolution of the idea of a Code of Conduct 
under the Convention being a useful part of 
that web in meetings of the States Parties to 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BTWC) during the past two decades. 
Following the failure to bring the decade-long 
efforts to strengthen the Convention to a 
successful conclusion at the 2001 5th Review 
Conference the UK, as one of the three 
Depositary States for the Convention, 
produced a summary (a Green Paper) of the 
available options for developing the 
Convention in the run up to the 
recommencement of the meeting in late 
2002. A review of this paper8 noted that one 
option was “codes of conduct for professional 
bodies” but also noted that “[W]hile there 
would be benefits from such an international 
code of ethics, the Green Paper says nothing 
as to how such a code might be developed or 
implemented.” Nevertheless, at the meeting 
in Geneva States Parties to the BTWC 
agreed that as part of the new Intersessional 
Process of annual meetings at Expert (MX) 
level (in the summer) and State Parties 
(MSP) level (later in the year) the content, 
promulgation, and adoption of codes of 
conduct for scientists would be the subject 
for the meetings in 2005.9 These annual 
meetings in 2003, 2004 and 2005 would be 
used to discuss, and promote common 
understanding and effective actions to 
support the Convention. 
2. The Initial Meeting on Codes of 
Conduct in 2005 
 
By the time of the 2005 Meeting of Experts, 
the difficulties encountered in the later stages 
of the attempt to negotiate a verification 
system during the 1990s had reduced and 
there was certainly an attempt to deal 
seriously with the issue of codes of conduct 
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with large numbers of papers being produced 
for the meetings in 2005 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Papers produced for the 2005 
Meeting on Codes of Conduct* 
Background Papers 
Four Papers by the SecretariatOne 
Presentation by the United States 
State Working Papers (Total 35) 
Argentina 1, Canada 7, UK 4, Germany 6, 
Russia 2, China 1, Japan 2, India 1, 
Indonesia 1, South Africa 1, Iran 1, 
Australia 4, Cuba 2, Korea 1, Italy 1 
Additional Working Papers at the MSP 
India 1, Russia 1 
*Data from the UN website in Geneva under 
Biological Weapons Convention/Meetings and 
Documents. 
The papers10 by the Secretariat covered 
codes that referred to the BTWC, codes 
relevant to the life sciences that did not refer 
to the BTWC, elements of codes from other 
fields and relevant organisation, associations, 
professional bodies and institutions which 
could serve as sources of guidance in the 
formulation of codes of conduct. The 
presentation by the United States was a 
wide-ranging review of relevant codes in the 
United States.11 It began by asking some 
basic questions about codes of conduct (Table 
2). 
Table 2: Some Basic Questions about Codes of Conduct* 
 
What is a "Code of Conduct"? 
 Formal statement of values and professional practices of a group of individuals with a 
common focus, either an occupation, academic field, or social doctrine. 
 Defines the expectations and directs the actions of a group. 
 
Examples of Codes of Conduct for the Life Science 
 The Nuremberg Code 
 The Belmont Report 
 American Society of Microbiology (ASM) Code of Conduct 
 Code of Ethics for the Life Sciences 
What is a "Code of Conduct"? 
 Government cannot oversee all scientists and experiments across the nation. 
 Offers greatest opportunity for improving security of research at the level of individual 
scientists: 
 Increases understanding of biosecurity; 
 Persistent reminder of moral and ethical responsibilities: 
 Creates a "culture of responsibility and accountability." 
 Sets professional standards that may have legal implications. 
*From BWC/MSP/2005/MX/MISC.4. 
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Canada similarly submitted a series of papers 
on common elements codes used in 
government, professional associations, 
academia and biodefence together with 
separate papers on the overlap between 
codes of conduct and legislation and on the 
functions of codes of conduct. However, the 
paper on the functions of codes also 
considered their possible weaknesses noting, 
for example, that:12 
“False or unrealistic expectations can damn 
the best of ideas. The creation of code of 
conduct that will make for a safer, happier, 
more productive work environment is a 
lofty goal, but one that will be doomed to 
failure if the code is ignored…. In addition, 
an ambitious code of conduct can be derailed 
by individuals who decide that they do not 
wish to follow its provisions, with no 
perceptible consequences to them. This is a 
key problem with virtually all codes of 
conduct that lack the power of applying 
sanctions to violators. Even a code that may 
have the backing of a financial, professional 
or legislative sanction may succumb to the 
pitfalls of disillusionment if not properly 
constructed.” 
 
A related point of particular interest here was 
raised by Australia in its Working Paper 29.13 
This stated that: 
 
“1. Amongst the Australian scientific 
community, there is a low level of awareness 
of the risk of misuse of the biological 
sciences to assist in the development of 
biological or chemical weapons. Many 
scientists working in ‘dual-use’ areas simply 
do not consider the possibility that their 
work could inadvertently assist in a 
biological or chemical weapons programme. 
For most of these researchers, biological 
weapons issues may seem irrelevant and 
therefore strong advocacy is required to 
overcome natural resistance or 
ignorance…” (emphasis added) 
The paper therefore continued by reasoning 
it followed that” 
 
“… Introducing Codes of Conduct that 
highlight these issues is an important step 
in raising awareness. However, it is not 
enough simply to put such Codes in place. 
Without effective measures to educate 
scientists about the existence  and 
importance of such Codes, attitudes and 
awareness will remain largely 
unchanged.” (emphasis added). 
 
Brian Rappert and Malcolm Dando had 
reported just before the Meeting of Experts 
on the results of a series of seminars that 
they had conducted at life science 
departments in universities in the UK. They 
concluded that:14 
 
“There was little evidence from our 
seminars that participants: 
 
a. Regarded bioterrorism or bioweapons as 
a substantial threat; 
 
b. Considered that developments in the life 
sciences research  contributed  to 
biothreats; 
 
c. Were aware of the current debates and 
concerns about dual-use research; or 
 
d. Were familiar with the BTWC.” (original 
emphasis). 
 
These authors were therefore in agreement 
with the Australian position. Moreover, in a 
further paper before the Sixth Review 
Conference in 2006, they reported very 
similar findings from seminars in five other 
countries.15 The need for education of life 
scientists was reiterated by the Russian 
Federation in a paper for the Meeting of 
States Parties later in 2005.16 Russia 
supported the idea of a code and gave it as 
the first core element that scientists should 
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“[B]e well informed of, and apply in their 
practice, international and national 
regulatory legal instruments on the 
prohibition of biological and toxin weapons.” 
So even in 2005 just introducing a code of 
conduct was not seen to be sufficient to deal 
with the problem of the potential misuse of 
research by some of the States Parties. 
3. The Meeting on Codes of Conduct 
in 2008 
 
Given this level  of interest it was 
unsurprising that the 6th Review Conference 
in 2006 decided that in 2008 during the 
Second Intersessional Process States Parties 
would focus on two topics, the second of 
which being:17 
 
“…Oversight, education, awareness raising, 
and adoption and/or development of codes 
of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse 
in the context of advances in bio-science and 
bio-technology research with the potential 
of use for purposes prohibited by the 
Convention.” 
 
Again in 2008, there were two contributions 
by the Implementation Support Unit on 
Codes of Conduct, Education and 
Awareness-Raising and a further eight 
Working Papers by States Parties, including 
by China,18 on these topics. The most 
significant contribution was by the 
Netherlands. Their Working Paper stated 
that:19 
 
“A code is a set of principles and instructions 
that are binding on members of a particular 
group in a profession or 
industry.…Moreover, codes can be 
classified into different types. Brian 
Rappert developed this typology…” 
(emphasis added). 
 
Brian Rappert, as a Sociologist, had 
suggested the typology that the Working 
Paper then set out. This typology can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Aspirational Codes (Set Standards); 
 
 Advisory Codes (Provide Guidelines) 
 
 Enforceable Codes (Make Legal 
Requirements) 
 
Today, a decade and a half after Rappert’s 
original 2004 paper, it is well worth reading, 
particularly his summary of the state of the 
discussions about codes of conduct at that 
stage:20 
 
“There is a renewed interest in codes to 
apply to the scientific and industrial life 
sciences community. Despite the extent and 
varied interest in a code or codes, there is a 
lack of detailed proposals about just what 
such a code or codes would entail. A close 
reading of the initial proposals shows that 
there are different concepts about who 
should devise codes; whether they should 
be voluntary or enforceable; what purpose 
they might serve (e.g., raise awareness, 
proscribe specific actions); what issues they 
should cover; by what mechanisms they 
could be agreed; whether a new code is 
necessary or existing ones should be 
augmented; and whether there should be a 
single universal code or various local 
ones…” 
 
Rappert also argued that it could be very 
confusing if different people were discussing 
different types of codes. It has become clear 
that the discussions in Geneva are best 
related to an Aspirational Code that could 
be agreed at this international level and then 
implemented in a variety of codes to fit the 
different requirements in various countries. 
What it is important to understand is that in 
2008 it was widely thought that developing 
a code could be a means to raise awareness 
of the problem of dual use amongst 
scientists. This idea was in direct 
contradiction to the view put forward in 
2005 by Australia. As was quite clearly 
stated in the Netherlands paper as “[T]he 
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main aim of the Dutch Code of Conduct on 
Biosecurity is to be seen as a contribution 
to awareness raising.” The code developed 
by the Netherlands was widely circulated for 
example by the InterAcademy Panel, but 
while the need for education was noted in 
the code there was no requirement for it to 
be in place to support the code. The impact 
of the lack of education was illustrated by 
the account given by Koos van der Bruggen 
of the surprise, among  the young 
researchers in the Netherlands who 
researched on the airborne transmission of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2011, at 
the consternation caused by the submission 
of their work for publication. According to 
this account, one of the researchers said 
that:21 
“…he never imagined that the paper would 
get a red light from the NSABB [National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity in 
the United States] and become the focus of 
a heated international debate about the 
limits of academic freedom. Watching the 
flood of news coverage, ‘it was strange to 
think that we had created all of that in our 
lab’…” 
 
That in regard to an experiment that many 
security analysts would see as raising very 
obvious dual-use concerns. 
 
Nevertheless, progress was being made in 
the development of educational material 
linked to the BTWC for life scientists. For 
example, at the 2008 Meeting of Experts 
Professor Norihiko Yamada made a 
Statement in the Non-Government 
Organisations section on a joint Japan/UK 
project on the development of an Educational 
Module for Life Scientists. The module is still 
available on the website of the Federation of 
American Scientists and consists of lecture 
slides, references and question topics for 21 
lectures in five sections: Introduction; The 
Threat of Biological Warfare, Biological 
Terrorism and the International Prohibition 
Regime; The Dual-Use Dilemma and the 
Responsibilities of Scientists; National 
Implementation of the BTWC; and Building 
an Effective Web of Prevention to Ensure 
Benign Development. 
 
4. Developing Ideas on Education in 
Support of Codes of Conduct 
 
This lack of education about dual use was 
again brought to the attention of States 
Parties in a contribution by Japan in a joint 
Working Paper titled Possible approaches 
to education and awareness-raising among 
life scientists by Australia, Canada, Japan, 
New Zealand, Republic of Korea, 
Switzerland, Kenya, Sweden, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom and the United States at the 
Seventh Review Conference in 2011. Japan’s 
contribution stated that:22 
“…the National Defense Medical College 
(NDMC) in Japan and the University of 
Bradford in the UK conducted collaborative 
research to analyse the current state of 
biosecurity education in Japan. The 
research found that there was a lack of 
educational topics on biosecurity despite a 
certain level of presence of dual-use 
references, mainly due to an absence of 
space in the existing curricula, an absence 
of time and resources to develop new 
curricula, an absence of expertise as well as 
doubt about the need for biosecurity 
education…” 
 
The paper also noted that “[P]arallel to this 
survey, the NDMC and the University of 
Bradford also jointly developed an online 
learning module in applied dual-use 
biosecurity education.” Moreover, given that 
level of interest in the topic amongst States 
Parties it was not surprising that the Review 
Conference decided that, under the Standing 
Agenda on developments in the field of 
science and technology related to the 
Convention, the Third Intersessional Process 
would consider:23 
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(d) voluntary codes of conduct and other 
measures to encourage responsible 
conduct by scientists, academia and 
industry; 
 
(e) education and awareness-raising about 
risks and benefits of life sciences and 
biotechnology…” 
 
Thus, the Meeting of States Parties in 2015 
concluded that:24 
 
“To further address  education  and 
awareness-raising about risks and benefits 
of life sciences and biotechnology, States 
Parties recognized that the continuous and 
accelerating rate of progress in scientific 
knowledge requires the necessity of 
deepening a culture of responsible use of 
this knowledge, which takes into account the 
object and purpose of the Convention 
without undermining peaceful uses. In order 
to further efforts on  education and 
awareness-raising about risks and benefits 
of life sciences and biotechnology, States 
Parties discussed the need to share 
information and knowledge on these 
developments, including dual-use research 
of concern.” 
 
Then in 2016 at the Preparatory Committee 
for the Seventh Review Conference, China 
and Pakistan put forward a significant 
proposal for the development of a template 
for a code of conduct. Their Working Paper 
stated that:25 
 
“With the aim to prevent abuse and misuse 
of bioscience and technology, fulfil the aims 
and objectives of the Convention and 
strengthen global biosecurity governance, 
China has proposed the development of a 
template of biological scientist code of 
conduct within the framework of the 
Convention in December 2015…” 
 
The paper went on to point out that many 
States had indicated support for the idea and 
provided suggestions. The elements of the 
proposed code are set out in Table 3A. The 
Working Paper proposed that States Parties 
should “[F]ully exchange views on the issue 
‘the development of the template of biological 
scientist code of conduct under the 
framework of the BWC’ under relevant 
agenda of the Eighth Review Conference.” 
 
Table 3A: Elements of the 2015 China/ 
Pakistan Draft Model Code of Conduct 
for Biological Scientists* 
 
1. Ethical Benchmark 
2. Legal Restraint 
3. Research Integrity 
4. Respect for the Object of Research 
5. Applying Science Research and its 
Relevant Process 
6. Constraint on the Spread of Research 
7. Popularizing Science and Technology 
8. Organisation's Role 
9. international Exchange 
* From BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.30 
 
At the Review Conference itself Ukraine and 
the UK, reflecting on their joint studies and 
research, pressed the case for serious 
attention to be given to the education of 
scientists given the current lack of awareness 
of the Convention and its implications. Their 
joint Working Paper argued that:26 
“18. The Conference should therefore 
adopt the following language in the 
Final Declaration text for Article IV: 
 
The Conference stresses the critical 
importance of biosecurity education 
and awareness-raising in achieving 
effective implementation of the 
Convention, which should be put into 
effect through national 
implementation measures, as 
appropriate, in accordance with the 
constitutional process and practices of 
each State Party. 
67 Jan-Jun 2020 
 
 
19. The Conference notes that such 
measures could include… 
 
(c) promoting the development and 
implementation of training and 
education programmes as well as 
training guides, handbooks and course 
materials, including raising awareness 
of the implications of dual use 
research and technology, for those 
granted access to biological agents 
and toxins relevant to the Convention, 
and especially for those with the 
knowledge or capacity to modify such 
agents and toxins…” 
Ukraine, Japan and the UK again pressed the 
case for serious attention to be given to 
education at the 2017 Meeting of States 
Parties in a Working Paper on Recent 
Developments in Education. The joint paper 
suggested that:27 
 
“19. There are a number of key points that 
States Parties might draw from these 
experiences, taking into account what is 
most appropriate given their own national 
structures and organisations: 
 
The need to reach out and engage with 
stakeholders over a period, obtain their 
interest and support, and build networks; it 
is especially important to engage with staff 
who will deliver the teaching, and students 
who will study the materials, to ensure that 
learning will be effective. 
 
The need to develop appropriate teaching 
materials, adapting what is already available 
for their own national circumstances and 
developing complementary material where 
necessary. 
 
The benefits of international collaboration 
and shared experience and expertise. 
 
The benefits of using websites and online 
techniques to facilitate communication and 
learning. 
The importance of continuing efforts to 
ensure sustainability.” 
 
Finally, China and Pakistan made a clear-cut 
proposal for bringing this long period of 
development to a conclusion at the Ninth 
Review Conference in 2021. At the 2018 
Meeting of Experts, they presented a 
Working Paper that included a draft Model 
Code of Conduct for Biological Scientists 
(Table 3B). 
Table 3B: Elements of the 2018 China 
Draft Model Code of Conduct for 
Biological Scientists* 
 
1. Ethical Standard 
2. Research Integrity 
3. Respect for the Object of Research 
4. Process Management for Science 
Research 
5. Constraint on the Spread of Research 
Outcome 
6. Popularisation of Science and Technology 
7. Institution’s Role 
8. Education and Training 
9. Awareness and Engagement 
10. International Exchanges 
*From reference 24 
Crucially, China’s Working Paper stated:28 
“9. Hereby, we propose to: 
Continue in-depth discussion on the topic 
of ‘development of a model code of conduct 
for biological scientists’, with a view to 
reaching consensus on the content of the 
model code of conduct. 
 
Facilitate the approval of the model code of 
conduct for biological scientists by the 
Ninth Review Conference, as well as the 
authorization by the Review Conference to 
work on implementation and promotion of 
the model code of conduct in the future 
inter-sessional process.” 
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The presentation at the Meeting of Experts 
had been preceded by an international 
conference in Tianjin, China on Building a 
Global Community of Shared Future for 
Biosecurity: Development of a Code of 
Conduct for Biological Scientists at which 
China’s ideas for the code were discussed in 
detail by a range of 28 experts from 14 
different countries, 6 experts from 
international organisations and a large host 
delegation from China itself. The elements 
of the Code as set out in Table 3B. 
It will be noted that there was a significant 
change in the elements of the code after the 
Tianjin meeting. As emphasised in Table 3B 
the elements 8 and 9 were added to the 
previous version of the code shown in Table 
3A. The envisaged code of conduct now 
clearly had a key element (8) concerned with 
emplacement of an effective system of 
education for scientists which stated that: 
 
“8. (Education and training) Scientific 
community and professional associations 
should play an active role in education and 
training. Increase public awareness of the 
Convention, and establish  a safety 
education and training system for all 
parties involved in biotechnology research. 
Biological scientists should be encouraged 
to engage in dialogue and cooperation with 
social scientists, philosophers  and 
anthropologists, so as to have a better 
understanding of the possible ethical and 
social implication of relevant biological 
research and its outcome.” (emphasis 
added) 
 
It also had element 9 devoted to awareness- 
raising and engagement of scientists that 
stated: 
 
“9. (Awareness and engagement) 
Biological scientists should be fully aware 
of the potential threats of dual-use research 
to human society, ecological environment 
and economic security. It is advocated to 
promote the peaceful application of 
biological research achievements, to 
prevent the abuse and misuse of biological 
products, scientific knowledge, technology 
and equipment, and to consciously resist 
any unethical scientific conducts that are 
harmful to human society.” (emphases 
added) 
 
The new version of the code retained 
element 10 on the kind of international 
cooperation that will be needed for example 
to deal with threats of the kind illustrated 
by the present COVID-19 outbreak. 
 
Then in his report of the meeting, the Chair 
of the MX2 Session on science and technology 
concluded that such a code of conduct would 
be one of the elements that had the most 
chance of being agreed at the Ninth Review 
Conference:29 
 
“…It is the Chair’s view that…activities of 
the ISP should focus on issues that achieved 
greater commonality of approaches among 
delegations. In this regard, two areas could 
be explored: (i) risk assessment and 
management, and (ii) a voluntary code of 
conduct for biological scientists and 
relevant personnel.” 
 
“The Chair sees the two topics above as those 
that could lead to a meaningful discussion 
during the remaining meetings of the ISP, 
in 2019 and 2020. They seem to present 
the best prospect for an agreed outcome on 
S&T [Science and Technology] issues in the 
2021 Review Conference of the BWC…” 
 
How this plays out will depend on how well 
meetings of the BTWC succeed in 2020 and 
2021 in the lead up to the decision making 
9th Review Conference. However, China’s 
attitude to the misuse of biotechnology 
became very clear at the end of 2019 when 
the scientist who used CRISPR/Cas 
technology to edit the genomes of three 
human babies was sentenced to 3 years in 
jail and a large fine by a court in Shenzhen 
for illegal medical practice.30 
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5. International Comparisons 
 
Of course, biological weapons are just one of 
the three types of generally acknowledged 
weapons of mass destruction and it is 
therefore not surprising that similar 
discussions have taken place in regard to 
chemical and nuclear weapons. The 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) that implements the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
produced the Hague Ethical Guidelines, 
essentially an Aspirational Code of Conduct, 
in applying the norms of the practice of 
chemistry to support the CWC in 2015 
(Table 4). There clearly exist differences 
between the code proposed by China for the 
BTWC (Table 3B) from that agreed for the 
CWC (Table 4). For example, the biological 
code necessarily has more emphasis on 
respect for the subjects of research as much 
more of the experimentation involves living 
organisms, but the clear prominence given 
to education and awareness-raising is 
obvious in both. 
* Table 4: Core Elements of The Hague 
Ethical Guidelines 
 
1. Sustainability 
2. Education 
3. Awareness and Engagement 
4. Ethics 
5. Safety and Security 
6. Accountability 
7. Oversight 
8. Exchange of Information 
* From the OPCW Website 
The newly established Advisory Board for 
Education and Outreach (ABEO) of the 
OPCW produced a major report in 2018 that 
emphasised the importance of active learning 
in engaging practicing scientists in 
maintaining and developing the prohibition 
to prevent the re-emergence of chemical 
weapons. The report stated that:31 
 
“One of the most important implications of 
this research is that ‘active learning’ 
methods, as opposed to traditional, lecture- 
based instruction in which students are 
passive recipients, produce better and 
longer lasting results. The results hold for 
factual information  and for more 
fundamental concepts. The methods can be 
applied in many settings, including the 
classroom, the laboratory, or the field.” 
 
These developments related to the CWC 
have been reported by the OPCW in detail 
to meetings of the BTWC States Parties in 
recent years.32 It is to be expected that the 
OPCW will over the coming years pursue a 
robust programme of education in support 
of the Hague Ethical Guidelines. Similarly, 
major developments have taken place in 
relation to nuclear security education. In 
2012 it was already clear that significant 
efforts were being made to improve the 
security education of scientists (and others) 
connected with the nuclear industry. A 
Briefing Paper titled Biosecurity Education 
for the Life Sciences: Nuclear Security 
Education Experience as a Model stated 
that:33 
“The INSEN [International Nuclear 
Security Education  Network]  is a 
partnership between the IAEA and 
educational and research institutions, and 
competent authorities. Its mission is ‘to 
enhance global nuclear security by 
developing, sharing and promoting 
excellence in nuclear security education’. 
In order to achieve its main objective, 
namely to foster and support the 
implementation of  nuclear security 
education, the Network has identified a set 
of key areas and activities for 
collaboration...” (original emphasis). 
 
The text continued by setting out some of 
these key areas as follows: 
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-”Development of peer-reviewed textbooks, 
computer-based teaching  tools and 
instructional material, including exercises 
and materials for laboratory work; 
 
-Faculty assignment and development in the 
different areas of nuclear security through 
mutual faculty exchanges and/or joint 
development and implementation of in- 
depth nuclear security training programmes 
or school…. 
 
-Quality assurance: consistency with IAEA 
defined terminology described in the IAEA 
Nuclear Security Glossary, the 
Fundamentals and the Recommendations 
documents… 
 
-Performance of surveys on the 
effectiveness of nuclear security education 
among students and faculty.” 
 
 
Even in 2012, this was an endeavour of a 
different order to anything being envisaged 
in relation to the BTWC even today. 
 
The importance of the INSEN model was 
emphasised in a major review of the 
literature on dual use and responsible 
conduct in 2018. The authors concluding 
that:34 
 
“…We found that while there were 
discussions in the literature about specific 
elements of culture (management systems, 
leadership and/or personnel behavior, 
beliefs and attitudes, or principles for 
guiding decisions and behaviors), there was 
a general lack of integration of these 
concepts, as well as limited information 
about specific indicators or metrics and the 
effectiveness of training or  similar 
interventions. We concluded that life 
scientists seeking to foster a culture of 
biosafety and biosecurity should learn from 
the substantial literature in analogous areas 
such as nuclear safety and security culture, 
high-reliability organizations, and the 
responsible conduct of research, among 
others.” 
Then in a follow-up effort to find means of 
assessing the Culture of Biosafety, 
Biosecurity, and Responsible Conduct in the 
Life Sciences an attempt has been made to 
modify the nuclear security approach for the 
life sciences. The working draft titled Culture 
of Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Responsible 
Conduct in the Life Sciences: (Self) 
Assessment Framework stated that:35 
 
“This tool intends to provide a measure of 
the organizational culture of biosafety, 
biosecurity, and responsible conduct to aid 
in the process of enhancing such culture at 
the local level through baseline and periodic 
assessments.” 
 
And it pointedly drew upon the nuclear 
security programme adding that: 
 
“While this is an attempt to adapt the nuclear 
safety and security culture model to the 
biological domain, future efforts to 
holistically integrate characteristics and 
indicators of an organizational culture 
across chemical, biological, and 
radiological/nuclear (CBRN) domains may 
help establish a framework for holistically 
assessing the CBRN safety and security 
culture in laboratories and other related 
organizations working with such hazardous 
materials. Such efforts will not be possible 
without the leadership of major 
international organizations and the support 
of professional associations.” 
 
In this tool biosafety, biosecurity and 
responsible is defined as:36 
 
“An assembly of beliefs, attitudes, and 
patterns of behavior of individuals and 
organizations that can support, complement 
or enhance operating procedures, rules, and 
practices as well as professional standards 
and ethics designed to prevent the loss, 
theft, misuse, and diversion of biological 
agents, related materials, technology or 
equipment, and the unintentional or 
intentional exposure to (or release of) 
biological agents.” 
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Then, for a particular laboratory, 
assessments are made of the management 
systems in place; the behaviour of the 
leadership and personnel; the principles for 
guiding decisions and behaviours; and the 
beliefs, opinions and attitudes of those 
involved. For example, in regard to beliefs, 
opinions and attitudes people carrying out 
the self-assessment are asked to state the 
extent that they agree with a series of 
questions such as those set out in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Questions about Beliefs, Attitudes and Opinions* 
 
1. There is a risk of bioterrorism or an attack with a biological weapon. 
5. Biosafety and/or biosecurity deficiencies or vulnerabilities are corrected with a sense of 
urgency. 
10. I am aware that there are ethical, legal, and societal issues and consequences attached to 
my research. 
13. My organization has a culture that supports and encourages trust, collaboration, consultation, 
and communication with regard to biosafety and biosecurity. 
14. National policy and legislation relevant to the life sciences aim to provide protection against 
the misuse of science. 
17. I have received adequate training on the procedures necessary to conduct my work without 
compromising safety and security. 
19. Scientists have an obligation to do no harm. 
20. I do/would/will report my concerns to the appropriate people, authorities, and/or agencies 
if I become aware of activities that violate the Biological and Toxin Convention, United 
Nations Security Council resolution 1540, or international customary law 
 
*From reference 31. 
 
Answers to these questions can then be 
summarized in a colour chart to give a picture 
of the state of the organization in regard to 
biosafety, biosecurity and responsible 
conduct and from that picture suggestions 
can be made as to how the organization can 
be improved. 
6. Conclusions 
 
When the COVID-19 outbreak is over there 
will undoubtedly be many investigations 
about what happened and what should be 
done to prevent any further outbreaks – 
natural, accidental or deliberate – in the 
future. There will be many proposals put 
forward of various importance and difficulty 
of implementation. We would suggest that 
one important proposal should be the 
agreement of an Aspirational Code of 
 
 
Conduct under the BTWC as proposed by 
China with mandatory education in order to 
effectively engage life scientists in protecting 
their work from misuse. After almost 20 
years of discussion, the proposal is well 
understood by many States Parties and could 
be agreed as a set of principles like the 
Hague Ethical Guidelines and then 
implemented in national codes of various 
kinds as fits different national circumstances. 
In relation to awareness-raising and 
education initiatives of the kind that would 
be needed to underscore understanding of 
the relevance of such codes, important 
contributions in this connection have already 
resulted from the state – academic 
collaboration with the production by the 
University of Bradford of a Guide to 
Biological Security37 that is accompanied by 
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a Team-Based-Learning Handbook38. The 
chief objective of the latter is to supplement 
the former by combining teaching material 
in biological security with an active learning 
training approach – Team-Based Learning 
(TBL) - so as to empower educators, 
students and practitioners as they begin to 
engage with biological security. Further to 
this, the use by Bradford39 of such techniques 
in proof of concept continuing professional 
development training has been undertaken 
under the auspices of the European Union’s 
Human Brain Project where, in 2017 and 
2018, evidence-based training of 
neuroscience professionals and practitioners 
at the Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, 
demonstrated improvement in the 
knowledge and understanding of participants 
through engagement in discussions 
concerning the ethical, legal and social aspects 
of biological security. 
The world is in the midst of a century of 
unprecedented change, and the 45-year-old 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
stands on a new starting line. It is to be hoped 
that the international community will take 
the commemoration of the 45th anniversary 
of the entry into force of the Convention as 
an opportunity to keep pace with the times, 
comprehensively advance the aims and 
objectives of the Convention, deepen 
international cooperation on biosecurity, and 
actively promote the establishment of a 
community of biological security for the 
destiny of mankind. 
* A presentation based on an earlier version of 
this paper was given at a meeting in St 
Petersburg in December 2019. Dando, M R. and 
Whitby, S. (2019) Towards Mandatory 
Education in Support of Biosecurity Codes of 
Conduct. Presentation at the Third Workshop 
of the Academic Network for European 
Security Studies,  St  Petersburg  State 
University, 16 – 17 December. 
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